I tend to agree, although much useful discussion happens here, even without facing up to the problem of consciousness.

This from the link ...

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It is undeniable that some organisms are subjects of experience. But the question of how it is that these systems are subjects of experience is perplexing. Why is it that when our cognitive systems engage in visual and auditory information-processing, we have visual or auditory experience: the quality of deep blue, the sensation of middle C? How can we explain why there is something it is like to entertain a mental image, or to experience an emotion? It is widely agreed that experience arises from a physical basis, but we have no good explanation of why and how it so arises. Why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all? It seems objectively unreasonable that it should, and yet it does.
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There's good stuff in the sci.psychology.consciousness newsgroup from time to time. I like Stuart Hamneroff's ideas. If he's on the right track (and he is) there are profound philosophical implications.