I'm not sure we can discuss the merits (or otherwise) of premies claims about Knowledge without at least some consideration of what conciousness is about.

>How would you demonstrate that your consciousness is illusory?<

I'm not aware that anyone has successfully demonstrated either the pro or con position on the 'illusory human conciousness' hypothesis - although Susan Blackmore has written cogently about the hypothesis.

The problem with Jonx is he wants to have a discussion in which the last thirty years of psychology, neurology and cognitive science simply hasn't happened. The 'illusory human conciousness' hypothesis is an entirely sound piece of thinking which if correct would make all 'internal' experience a function of belief - not just Jonx's meditation experience.

Jonx is insisting that Rawat's K is empirical and concrete - as it only happens within a person one of the things he should reasonably address is why the internal experience of K is not consigned to 'belief' by the implications of the 'illusory human conciousness' hypothesis.

To be clear I'm not advancing this particular hypothesis as having especial validity - it just demonstrates very well the problem of defining 'belief'.

N